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The Influence of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on Anti-Blasphemy 
Laws 
INTRODUCTION 
 On September 29, 2012, over 1,000 Muslim activists gathered at the Ford Performing 
Arts and Community Center in Dearborn, Michigan.  The activists were protesting an online 
video that some then considered to have motivated the attacks on the American Embassy in 
Benghazi, Libya, resulting in the assassination of the American Ambassador on September 11, 
2012. The protesters consider the video to be an example of anti-Islamic hate speech.  To combat 
such hate speech the Muslim activists have proposed the passage of laws throughout the world 
banning speech which ridicules Islam. 
1
 
 The Dearborn Muslim activists are not alone in their criticism of speech that slanders 
Islam and the prophet Mohammed. On September 26, 2012 Mohamed Morsi, the newly elected 
President of Egypt,  referred to the insulting video as an obscenity that has been “released as part 
of an organized campaign against Islamic sanctities which are unacceptable”. In his address 
President Morsi urged the United Nations to promote international legislation criminalizing 
speech that insults religion. 
2
 
 Since 1999, international organizations, including the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, have proposed resolutions before the United Nations, that encourage member 
nations to enact laws outlawing conduct and speech which foments “discrimination, extremism 
and misperception leading to polarization and fragmentation with dangerous unintended and 
unforeseen consequences."  Essentially, the proposals seek international regulations banning 
                                                          
1
 Joe Newby, Muslims in Dearborn rally against free speech, call for anti-blasphemy laws, The Dearborn Examinor, 
September 29, 2012. 
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blasphemy. The earliest proposals sought specific international bans against blasphemy of Islam. 
Later proposals have broadened the proposed prohibition to include all religions.  
 Efforts directed toward the international criminalization of blasphemy have been 
thwarted by the western democracies in the United Nations to date due to the conflict of such 
laws with the right of freedom of expression, and due to a concern that such laws would be used 
as the basis for religious persecution and oppression. One day before Mr. Morsi’s speech, 
President Obama addressed the same assembly and contended that speech that insults religion, 
however blasphemous, must be tolerated. President Obama said that “Given the power of faith in 
our lives, and the passions that religious differences can inflame, the strongest weapon against 
hateful speech, is not repression, it is more speech.”3 
The conflict between the attempts of Muslim activists to ban speech that ridicules Islam 
on the one hand, and the comments of President Obama advancing the protections of free speech, 
thought and religion found in the American constitution on the other, demonstrates the 
international conflict between fundamentalist Islamic nations that abhor speech that ridicules 
their faith, and those nations which have constitutional foundations protecting such expressions.  
That conflict has had consequences for the international legal community, particularly in the 
United Nations and its member nations, to balance free speech rights with efforts to curtail 
speech which has caused violent outbursts in the Muslim world.  
 This paper will examine the manner in which the United Nations, principally through the 
adoption and implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has 
attempted to achieve such a balance.  The conclusion reached are: 1) the international 
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jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee interpreting individual rights of 
free speech and religion have guarded those rights with great vigilance. 2) the sensitivity to the 
rights of free speech and religion reflected in the decisional law of the Human Rights Committee 
makes unlikely any agreement by Muslim nations with powerful fundamentalist political 
factions, such as Pakistan, to agree to the jurisdictional authority of the United Nations 
Committee concerning issues of freedom of religion within their territory.  3) notwithstanding 
the refusal of such nations to submit to the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee of the 
United Nations, other provisions of the Covenant, notably the reporting obligations of signatory 
nations, have modestly blunted the effect of the most onerous aspects of the Muslim anti-
blasphemy laws and 4) the very existence of the Covenants as the articulation by the 
international community of the standard of basic human rights and the status of  many Islamic 
nations as a signatories to those standards as  members of that community of nations are 
substantial factors in combating the anti-blasphemy laws.  In that manner, the United Nations has 
achieved a tenuous, delicate and imperfect balance.  In essence, the United Nations has been an 
advocate for personal freedoms and has prevented the executions resulting from the capital 
sentences imposed for violations of anti-blasphemy laws. 
 In conducting its analysis, this paper will focus on the anti-blasphemy laws of one 
particular Islamic nation, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  That nation is constitutionally 
designated as a Muslim nation.  It has an overwhelmingly Muslim population of 97%.  It has 
small minorities of Hindus, Muslims and other non-Muslims.  Pakistan has codified anti-
blasphemy laws that specifically prohibit speech and conduct that ridicules Islam.  Prosecutions 
under those laws have resulted in international attention and protest.  Simply stated, the anti-
blasphemy laws of Pakistan are the “poster child” of the campaigns to reform those laws.  
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This paper will explore the origins of the modern international declaration of basic 
human rights through proclamations of the United Nations.  It will then contrast those 
declarations with those portions of the Pakistani Penal Code outlawing blasphemy, and the harsh 
practical results of those laws.  An analysis of decisional law of the Human Rights Committee 
concerning protections of religious freedoms relative to the likelihood of Islamic nations to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the United Nations on such issues will follow.  Finally, this paper 
will consider the modest, but critical influence that the United Nation’s declarations have had on 
the harshest aspects of those laws. 
ORIGINS OF COVENANT 
      The international civil rights movement was given impetus by the adoption on December 10, 
1948, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly.  
That document was historical in that for the first time an international organization made 
declarations as to a standard of the civil, political and individual rights that belong to all people.
4
 
On December 16, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR or the covenant).   Those conventions 
represent a comprehensive articulation of rules for the promotion of “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and freedoms.” 5 Included in the 53 articles comprising the ICCPR 
are rules prohibiting discrimination, genocide, compulsory labor, unfair imprisonment, and rules 
encouraging freedom of movement, marriage, and participation in public affairs.  Article 18 of 
the covenant preserves the right to all individuals of freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion. That article reads as follows:  
                                                          
4
 Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx 
5
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1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. 
No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, heath, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. 4. The states parties to the present 
covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and 
when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.  
The body created for judicial review of issues that arise out of the covenants is the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee.  That Committee consists of 18 members, called experts, 
who are elected by the nations who have signed the covenant.  The members are elected in their 
individual capacity and not as a representative of their nation.  They serve terms of four years, 
may be re-elected and are required to be people of high moral character and recognized experts 
in the field of human rights.
6
  
The Human Rights Committee has primary functions under the covenant to review 
human rights compliance reports that each participating nation is obligated to submit at regular 
intervals or upon request by the Committee. It also reviews and adjudges complaints concerning 
human rights violations that one signatory nation may file against another. The First Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so named because not all 
nations agreeing to the covenant have accepted the provision of the protocol, allows for the 
disposition by the Committee, of complaints alleging human rights violations filed by individuals 
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against states that have agreed to that protocol.
7
  The United States has not signed onto the first 
Optional Protocol.
8
  All majority Muslim nations, having a population greater than 10 million, 
are not signatories to the protocol with the exception of Algeria, Niger, Turkey and Uzbekistan.
9
  
Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan are not signatories to 
the First Protocol.
10
 An implication of the refusal of the largest Muslim nations to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee relative to individual grievances is a distrust on the 
part of those nations of the international community to respect Islamic values that are 
foundational for those countries. 
The sensitivities of Muslim nations to conduct that disrespects the Islamic faith is 
exemplified by the codification of anti-blasphemy laws in Pakistan. Chapter XV of the Penal 
Code of Pakistan, entitled “Of Offenses Relating to Religion” contains the sections of that 
nation’s laws making criminal any conduct or speech which is religiously offensive.  Those 
provisions include the following prohibitions: 
Section 295 the defiling of any place of worship, punishable by a term of imprisonment 
up to 2 years;  
Section 295 A.  malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings punishable by a term 
of imprisonment up to 10 years; 
 Section 295 B Desecration of the Qur’an punishable by imprisonment up to life;  
295 C Use of derogatory words against the prophet Muhammad punishable by death or 
imprisonment for life. 
 
                                                          
7
 Members of Human Rights Committee, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/members 
8
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Prosecutions under the section prohibiting derogations of the prophet Muhammad have 
resulted in the greatest amount of international concern and controversy.  The following cases 
are illustrative.   
The Case of the “Unclean” Farm Girl 
In the summer of 2009, Aasia Bibi was a poor Christian farm worker in the village of 
Ittan Wali in Pakistan’s Punjab province.  During a hot work day, Aasia dipped her cup into a 
communal bucket to retrieve water.  Muslim co-workers rebuked Aasia as they believe that 
Christians are unclean and that Aasia had contaminated the community water.  Aasia was 
expected to accept the indignity quietly.  She did not.  Instead, she presented a strong defense of 
Christianity and maintained that she had done nothing wrong.  According to Aasia’s family and 
others familiar with the case, Aasia’s defense of her own faith was understood by the Muslim co-
workers as being blasphemous toward Islam.   
 Aasia was accused by her co-workers as having insulted the prophet Muhammad.  
Villagers took their accusation to a local iman, who urged the faithful on the mosque 
loudspeakers to punish Aasia.  An angry village mob gathered outside of Aasia’s home.  The 
police took Aasia into custody whereupon Aasia was charged with insulting the prophet.  On 
November 8, 2010, after having spent 18 months in prison awaiting trial, Aasia was convicted of 
violating the anti-blasphemy laws and was sentenced to death.  
11
 
                      The Case of the Offensive Author 
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According to Amnesty International, on February 3, 2005 Younus Shaikh was arrested 
and charged under the Pakistani anti-blasphemy laws for insults against Islam and Muhammed.  
The insults were contained in a book written by Shaikh entitled “Satanic Cleric”.  Shaikh had 
contended in his book that stoning as a punishment for adultery is not mentioned in the Quran 
and that four historical leaders of Islam were Jews.  Shaikh has been sentenced to life in prison.
12
 
                          The Case of the Strident Bricklayer 
On October 14, 1996, Pakistani police arrested Ayub Masih, a Christian bricklayer, who 
was accused by a neighbor of having said that Christianity was “right”, and for having 
recommended that the neighbor read Salman Rushde’s “Satanic Verses”.  On the same day of 
Masih’s arrest, the entire Christian population of his village consisting of 14 families was forced 
to leave.  According to International Christian Concern, an organization that raises awareness of 
and advocates against persecution of Christians, the prosecution of Masih was in retaliation for 
his submitting an application to a government program providing for housing plots for homeless 
people.   Due to the absence of available housing, particularly for the Christian community, local 
landlords had been able to obtain labor from the Christian families at low wages in exchange for 
housing.  On April 20, 1998, Masih was sentenced to death.
13
 
                            The Offensive Medical Teacher 
                                                          
12
 Amnesty International Release, Public Al Index ASA 33/023/ 2005 UA 215.05, Fear for safety/Prisoner of 
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In October, 2000, Dr. M. Younus Shaikh, a Muslim teacher at a medical college in 
Islamabad, was charged with violating the anti-blasphemy laws of Pakistan based upon 
complaints registered by some of his students.  The students contended that in a lecture, Shaikh 
insulted Islam and the prophet by contending among other things, that the parents of the prophet 
Muhammad could not have been Muslims, because Islam began when Muhammad was 40 years 
of age, and Muhammad’s parents died before Islam existed.  When Dr. Shaikh was arrested, a 
fundamentalist Muslim group of which the accusing students were members mobbed the police 
station and threatened to burn it down in the event that a summary prosecution of Dr. Shaikh was 
not undertaken.  On August 18, 2001, Dr. Shaikh was found guilty in a private hearing and 
sentenced to death.
14
 
                                Assassinations of Reformers 
The effect of the blasphemy laws in Pakistan is not limited to criminal prosecutions.  
There are collateral consequences as well.  On January 4, 2011, Salman Taseer, the then 
governor of Punjab province, was assassinated by a member of his security detail.  Teaseer was a 
vocal supporter of Aasia Bibi, the Christian farmworker sentenced to death under the anti- 
blasphemy laws and was a vocal opponent of those laws.  Taseer’s assassin, Muntaz Qadri, cited 
Taseer’s opposition to the anti-blasphemy laws as his motivation for the murder.15  
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 On March 2, 2011, Shahbaz Bhatti, the Roman Catholic head of Pakistan’s Ministry of 
Minority Affairs, was assassinated shortly following his vows to pursue the repeal of Pakistan’s 
anti-blasphemy laws, notwithstanding death threats against him.
16
 
              The U.N. Human Rights Committee to the Rescue 
The anti-blasphemy laws of Pakistan represent the entrenchment of centuries old and 
deeply held religious convictions.  They arouse great passions and have the propensity to be used 
to persecute and oppress religious and ideological minorities.  The volatile eruptions of 
blasphemy claims represented by the above cited cases are reminiscent of the charges of 
witchcraft as told by Arthur Miller in his play, “the Crucible”.  These cases arouse a sense of pity 
and sympathy for anyone who lives in a society where such laws subject them to a charge of 
blasphemy at any time. 
The covenants can be thought of as the effort of the international community to calm the 
morass of religious and ideological passions result from the anti-blasphemy laws. The Human 
Rights Committee of the United Nations is a board consisting of 18 experts appointed by the 
signatory states to the Covenant.  The Committee monitors the implementation of the obligations 
contained in the Covenant by the signatory states.  It receives and reviews reports of the 
signatory states that detail the steps taken by those states to implement the rights contained in the 
Covenant.  The committee makes statements called “general comments”, which provide greater 
detail to signatory states so as to guide them in their compliance efforts.  The committee also 
receives and reviews complaints filed by individuals who contend that they are aggrieved by the 
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failure of a signatory state to comply with the Covenant, as well as complaints filed by one 
signatory state against another.   
The Human Rights Committee may only consider claims against a signatory to the 
Covenant if that state is a party to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, allowing for such a review.
17
   Pakistan is not such a nation-party.  
However, there are various decisions of the Human Rights Committee, although not having the 
force of law in Pakistan that provides logical precedence for determining the validity of the 
Pakistani anti-blasphemy laws under the ICCPR.  These decisions demonstrate a clear sensitivity 
on the part of the international community to the religious rights of individuals and an intention 
of the United Nations to protect those rights and curtail any conduct on the part of national 
governments that offend those individual rights.  It is virtual certain, when considering the 
decisions of the Human Rights Committee, that the anti-blasphemy laws of Pakistan would be 
found to be violations of the covenant. 
Communication No. 931/2000 is a decision of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee on a complaint filed by Ms. Raihon Hudoyberganova against Uzbekistan.  Ms. 
Hudoyberganova was a student in the Farsi Department of the Tashkent State Institute for 
Eastern Studies and a practicing Muslim.  In her second year of studies, Ms. Hudoyberganova 
began wearing the traditional Muslim headscarf (“hijab”).  Regulations were adopted by the 
University whereby no students were allowed to wear religious dress.   Ms. Hudoyberganova 
was expelled from the University for violation of those regulations.  In finding that the 
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regulations constituted a violation of Article 18 of the Covenant, the Committee stated at section 
6.2 of its decision: 
The Committee has noted the author’s (complainant) claim that her 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion was violated 
as she was excluded from University because she refused to 
remove the headscarf that she wore in accordance with her beliefs.  
The Committee considers that the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion encompasses the right to wear clothes or attire in public 
which is in conformity with the individual’s faith or religion.  
Furthermore, it considers that to prevent a person from wearing 
religious clothing in public or private may constitute a violation of 
article 18, paragraph 2, which prohibits any coercion that would 
impair the individual’s freedom to have or adopt a religion.  As 
reflected in the Committee’s General Comment No. 22 (para. 5), 
polices or practices that have the same intention or effect as direct 
coercion, such as those restricting access to education are 
inconsistent with article 18, paragraph 2. 
     The coercion applied by the state against Ms. Hudoyberganova was the denial 
of an educational opportunity that chilled her right to express her religious beliefs 
through the clothing that she wore.  The Pakistani criminal statute under which 
Aasia Bibi has been prosecuted, would necessarily fail scrutiny under the 
Covenants, because the right to proclaim one’s own religious views as good or 
“right” as stated by Ms. Bibi, is fundamental and necessary to the right of holding 
a religious belief.  In this manner, the wearing of a hijab by a Muslim woman and 
the proclamation of the truth of her religion by a Christian are analogous religious 
expressions.  If that expression constitutes a defilement of another religion under 
a criminal statute that includes death as the punishment for its violation, the 
coercive effect and the vitiation of the right to hold a religious belief is obvious 
and extreme.  The Hudoyberganova opinion would therefore, represent logical 
R. Lombardi 
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precedent demonstrating that the Pakistani anti-blasphemy laws are inconsistent 
with the ICCPR.  
     In Communication No. 1155/2003, the Committee considered the claims of the 
Leirvag family and other families against Norway, (where the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church is constitutionally identified as the state church), to a provision 
that required students to participate in a religious education program, entitled 
“Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education”.   If parents desired 
to exempt their children from certain aspects of that religious education program, 
they were required to provide reasons for that request. The complainants adhered 
to a non-religious humanist philosophy and contended that the limits placed on 
their ability to exempt their children from the religious education program 
violated their right to freedom of religion pursuant to Article 18 of the Covenants.   
     In finding that the Norwegian regulation did constitute a violation, the 
Committee stated at 14.6: 
The Committee considers, however, that even in the abstract, the 
present system of partial exemption imposes a considerable burden 
on persons in the position of the authors, insofar as it requires them 
to acquaint themselves with those aspects of the subject which are 
clearly of a religious nature, as well as with other aspects, with a 
view to determining which of the other aspects they may feel a 
need to seek – and justify – exemption from.  Nor would it be 
implausible to expect that such persons would be deterred from 
exercising that right, insofar as a regime of partial exemption could 
create problems for children which are different from those that 
may be present in a total exemption scheme. Indeed as the 
experience of the authors demonstrates, the system of exemptions 
does not currently protect the liberty of parents to ensure that the 
religious and moral education of their children is in conformity 
with their own convictions. 
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     In the Leirvag case, the Committee opined that the Covenants would be 
violated by an educational scheme that required parents to learn about the state 
sponsored religion, sufficient to articulate and present an objection to those 
aspects of a religious course of study to which the parents objected.  In effect, in 
order for the parents to prevent their children from participating in religious 
studies they found objectionable, the parents were required to study the state 
religion. The Committee therefore determined that the Norwegian regulation 
violated the Conventions.  
      Consider section 295 C of the Pakistan Penal Code entitled “Use of 
derogatory remarks, etc. in respect of the Muslim prophet” which states: 
“Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by 
any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred 
name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished 
with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” It seems 
obvious that if the defilement statute of the Pakistani Penal Code were presented 
to the Committee for evaluation under the Covenants, it too would be found to be 
in violation.  A person with an obvious interest in avoiding directly or indirectly, 
by insinuation, innuendo or imputation, any defilement of the prophet 
Muhammad, would of necessity study all aspects of Islam necessary to 
accomplish such avoidance, given that the failure to do so could result in a 
prosecution with a mandatory death sentence, the coercive effects on the 
individual’s right to religion in Pakistan dwarfs those under the Norwegian 
educational program.      
R. Lombardi 
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   The Human Rights Committee has also considered claims against a highly 
populated Islamic nation that is a signatory to the First Optional Protocol.  
Communications Nos. 1853/2008 and 1854/2008 is a consolidated decision of the 
Human Rights Committee concerning complaints of two Turkish citizens who 
argued that their country was violating the Article 18 right of freedom of religious 
expression by failing to provide an alternative to compulsory military service.  
The complainants, Cenk Atasoy and Arda Sarkut were Jehovah Witnesses who 
contended that their religious beliefs compelled a conscientious objection to 
military service and each refused such service.  Each complainant did indicate a 
willingness to provide civil service to their country, so long as that service was 
not military.  The failure of the complainants to report for military service resulted 
in a criminal prosecution against them, and the loss of employment of one of the 
complainants.  Turkey argued that Article 18 does not expressly require signatory 
states to accept conscientious objection to military service, and invoked the 
exceptions provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 18, which allow a signatory 
state to place restrictions on religious expression that are necessary for public 
safety and order.  Turkey argued that military service is necessary for the 
protection of all residents as a component of a national defense.  Turkey also 
argued that in a separate part of the Conventions, i.e. Article 8, prohibiting forced 
labor, the phrase “in countries where conscientious objection is recognized” 
appears, in the context of declaring that an alternative to military service does not 
constitute forced labor.  If the recognition of conscientious objection was required 
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by the Conventions, Turkey argued, Article 8 would not have referred to it as an 
option among signatory states.  
    In finding that Turkey did violate the religious freedoms provisions of the 
Conventions, the Committee stated at 10.5 to 12: 
In the present cases, the Committee considers that the authors’ 
(Claimants) refusal to be drafted for compulsory military service 
derives from their religious beliefs, which have not been contested 
and which are genuinely held, and that the authors’ subsequent 
prosecution and sentences amount to an infringement of their 
freedom of conscience, in breach of article 18, paragraph 1, of the 
Covenant.  The Committee recalls that repression of the refusal to 
be drafted for compulsory military service, exercised against 
persons whose conscience or religion prohibits the use of arms, is 
incompatible with article 18, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. 
    The Atasoy decision exemplifies aspects of the complaint resolution powers 
provided to the Human Rights Committee, and the way in which that power is 
exercised by it, that likely contribute to the reluctance of countries like Pakistan to 
sign the First Protocol and submit to the jurisdiction of the Committee.  First, the 
Committee demonstrated in the decision that prior decisional precedent is not 
binding under circumstances where it seeks to broaden the rights provided by the              
conventions.  In that regard, in considering Turkey’s claim that Article 8 clearly 
implies no covenant right to conscientious objection, the communication states: 
The Committee also notes the State party’s argument concerning 
article 8 of the Covenant, which states that “in countries where 
conscientious objection is recognized”, national service by 
conscientious objectors does not constitute forced or compulsory 
labour.  The Committee recalls that in its decision of 
inadmissibility regarding communication No. 185/1984, L.T.K. v. 
Finland, it had indeed regarded this phrase as reinforcing a 
conclusion that article 18 did not specifically confer a right to 
conscientious objection.  Since that time, however, the Committee 
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has confirmed that the oblique use of this phrase in a different 
context “neither recognizes nor excludes a right of conscientious 
objection”, and so does not contradict the necessary consequences 
of the Covenant’s guarantee of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.
18
 
     In determining a compulsory obligation on the part of signatory states to 
recognize conscientious objection, notwithstanding the implicit absence of such 
an obligation in article 8 of the conventions, and reversing its prior opinion to the 
contrary, the Committee did signal to signatory states that the Committee 
constituted an activist international judicial body.  Such a court is likely to be 
feared by nationalist groups within every country that are protective of their 
nation’s sovereignty.  That fear results in the reluctance of countries to agree to 
the jurisdiction of an international judicial body such as the United Nations 
Committee on Human Rights.  That fear is particularly acute in Islamic nations 
like Pakistan, where loss of sovereignty can be seen by fundamentalists as 
jeopardizing that nation’s religious foundations.  Thus, the United Nations, as the 
international governing body to which individuals turn to remedy religious 
violations, must tread lightly.  On the one hand, it’s judicial bodies must be 
strident in protecting those rights.  On the other, it’s advocacy of those rights will 
likely inhibit fundamentalist forces with a nation like Pakistan to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the United Nations. 
                             Compulsory Remedies under the Covenants 
     In the Atasoy decision, as in most decisions where the Committee has 
determined that a violation of the Covenants has occurred and where a remedy 
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should be provided to the complaining party, the Committee recited the basis of 
its jurisdictional authority to fashion such a remedy.  At para. 12-13 of the 
decision states:  
In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the 
State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an 
effective remedy, including expunging their criminal records and 
providing then with adequate compensation.  The State party is 
under an obligation to avoid similar violations of the Covenant in 
the future. 
     
Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional 
Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the 
Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the 
Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the 
State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals  within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction, the rights recognized in the 
Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy in 
case a violation has been established, the Committee wishes to 
receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about 
the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views.  The 
State party is also requested to publish these Views and to have 
them translated in the official language of the State party and 
widely distributed. 
     Each remedy fashioned by the Committee represents a loss of some of the 
sovereignty of the State party obligated to provide it.  In the Atasoy case, 
reasonable persons could dispute the obligation of a signatory state to 
acknowledge conscientious objection.  A fundamentalist nation like Pakistan, 
which has a history of tensions with its large neighbor India, would likely find the 
injunctive aspects of the Atasoy decision, a frightening danger to its national 
security, and the directive to pay damages to an individual who refuses 
compulsory military service, as a galling intrusion into its affairs.
19
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Other Decisions of the Human Rights Committee Likely to Offend 
Fundamentalists 
Decisions of the Human Rights Council that would likely offend 
fundamentalist Muslims are not only those based upon a right to religious 
expression.  Toonen v. Australia resulted from a complaint filed by a gay activist 
whose complaint concerned a criminal code section in the Australian territory of 
Tasmania which criminalized all form of sexual contact between men.  
Notwithstanding the fact that no prosecutions under the law had been initiated in 
years, Toonen argued that the existence of the statute subjected homosexuals to 
harassment and discrimination.  The Tasmanian authorities defended the laws on 
the grounds of public health, so as to avoid the spread of aids, and on moral 
grounds, which Tasmania argued, are deemed to be domestic issues under Article 
17 of the covenant.  In finding that the impugned law constituted a violation of the 
covenants, the Committee stated at para. 8.5 to 8.6: 
 As far as the public health argument of the Tasmanian authorities 
is concerned, the Committee notes that the criminalization of 
homosexual practices cannot be considered a reasonable means or 
proportionate measure to achieve the aim of preventing the spread 
of AIDS/HIV.  The government of Australia observes that statutes 
criminalizing homosexual activity tend to impede public health 
programs by driving underground many of the people at the risk of 
infection.   
Criminalization of homosexual activity thus would appear to run 
counter to the implementation of effective education programs in 
respect of the HIV/AIDS prevention.  Secondly, the committee 
notes that no link has been shown between the continued 
criminalization of homosexual activity and the effective control of 
the spread of the HIV/AIDS virus.  The Committee cannot accept 
either that for the purposes of article 17 of the Covenant, moral 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Committee has found Article 18 violations based upon similar reasoning.  See Min-Kyu Jeong et al v. The Republic 
of Korea, communication No.1642-17410/2007, April 26, 2011. 
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issues are exclusively a matter of domestic concern, as this would 
open the door to withdrawing from the Committee’s scrutiny a 
potentially large number of statutes interfering with privacy. 
     In the Toonen decision, the Committee was concerned that by leaving 
domestic moral issues as the business of the individual state parties, the 
Committee would then be precluded from declaring invalid any laws with a moral 
component that violated the covenant.  The likely corollary Muslim concern is 
that the moral laws compelled by the Islamic faith would be subject to wholesale 
invalidation by a group of 18 unelected bureaucrats that have shown enthusiastic 
judicial activism.  That concern, relative to anti-homosexuality laws, would be 
particularly acute in many Muslim nations where anti-gay sentiment is so 
extensive that experts have said that obtaining persecution asylum in the United 
States on behalf of gays from Muslim nations based upon anti-gay persecution is 
routinely easy.
20
  In that regard, fundamentalist nations such as Pakistan, base 
their attitudes on contemporary social issues, such as aids and homosexuality 
upon their religious convictions.  Their views on those issues are seen as harsh by 
most persons who do not share their religious convictions.  Decisions such as the 
Toonen opinion would be particularly likely to raise the ire of fundamentalists in 
Pakistan and make the ability of the United Nations to influence the anti-
blasphemy laws of that country more difficult. 
    The decision of the Committee in the matter of Waldman v. Canada is notable 
in that it demonstrates that the remedies fashioned by the Committee will 
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sometimes require the state parties to act affirmatively to provide 
accommodations to minority faiths.  In the Waldman case, the complainant was a 
Jewish parent who wished to provide a Jewish education to his children.  Canada 
has a bifurcated educational system in the province of Ontario, where the 
government provides full funding to public secular schools and to Roman 
Catholic schools.  Jewish and other religious schools receive only limited funding 
in the form of tax deductions and property tax exemptions.  Canada argued before 
the Committee that the bifurcated system was enshrined in the Canadian 
Constitution of 1867.  At that time a compromise was incorporated in the 
Canadian Constitution calling for the aforementioned funding scheme, because 
there was concern among the Roman Catholic minority of Ontario, that the 
educational system would be controlled by the Protestant majority. 
    The Committee determined that Canada’s refusal to provide a religious 
education to members of all faiths desiring such, while paying for religious 
education for Roman Catholic students constituted a violation of Article 18 of the 
Conventions.   The Committee determined that the enshrinement of the bifurcated 
system in the Canadian Constitution did not render that system inviolate.  It 
concluded that no matter what prejudice was suffered by Roman Catholics in 
Canada in 1867, there was no such contemporary prejudice and therefore no basis 
for the Canadian government to provide preferential treatment of Roman 
Catholics in the payment of education at religious schools. 
       Many Islamic nations are constitutionally self-identified as such.  Their 
educational systems as well as their laws, such as the aforementioned Pakistani 
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anti-blasphemy provisions, are expressly Islamic.  Those countries have special 
rules and afford special protections to the Muslim faith and its members.  It is 
highly likely that a Muslim government, when presented with a judicial ruling 
setting forth a requirement of providing state paid religious educations to 
adherents of minority faiths, even in a country that is a constitutionally designated 
Muslim nation, would be highly motivated to avoid the jurisdiction of the judicial 
authority that produced such a ruling. 
                                    Practical Influence of the Covenants 
     It is clear that Pakistan is presently not likely to submit to the jurisdiction of 
the Committee so as to allow its anti-blasphemy laws to be invalidated by the 
protections afforded by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
However, it is equally clear that the very existence of the Covenant and the fact 
that it has been ratified by the Pakistan government as an articulation of basic 
human rights, and as an agreement reached in the most visible international forum 
known to humankind, has been effective in vitiating the harshest aspects of those 
anti-blasphemy laws.    The Covenant has also been a powerful moral and 
practical force assisting those segments of Pakistan society who wish to bring 
about substantial human rights reform in that country so as to bring it in 
substantial if not full compliance with the guarantees of the Covenants. 
    The government of Pakistan established the Ministry of Human Rights in 
November, 2008. That ministry was instrumental in Pakistan’s ratification of the 
ICCPR on June 23, 2010 The conflict found in Pakistan between the 
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fundamentalist segments who resist the Covenant’s guarantees and the 
progressive sectors  seeking to implement those guarantees can be easily observed 
in the publications of that Ministry as well as in non-governmental Pakistani 
watch groups.  Mustafa Nawaz Khokhar, the present Pakistani Minister of Human 
Rights has stated in recognition of these conflicting sectors and in recognition of 
the need for Pakistan to align itself with the international community the 
following: 
The creation of an independent Ministry of Human Rights is an 
indication of the importance that the Government of Pakistan 
attaches to issues of human rights’ abuses…..  Furthermore, no 
discrimination can be made on the bases of religious beliefs, race, 
language, ethnicity, gender, et cet…  Some of our centuries old 
customs and mores are contrary to the notions of individual’s 
rights and liberties.  We have to create awareness that these 
practices are detrimental to realization of an individual’s full 
potential and thus hamper national progress. Simultaneously, we 
must see to it that perpetrators of such atrocities are brought to 
justice swiftly and their victims are provided all the assistance that 
they may require.
21
 
 The statement by the Minister demonstrates a critical self-evaluation of the 
Pakistani government on the issue of human rights, an expression that the country 
falls short on protecting civil rights, a clear acknowledgement that the “centuries 
old customs and mores” found in segments of Pakistani society  represent the 
primary obstacle in eradicating human rights violations, and a practical 
acknowledgement that complying with international standards of human rights 
will allow Pakistan to progress. 
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       According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the initial report of Pakistan concerning its compliance with its 
obligations under the Covenant, was due on September 23, 2011, but has not been 
issued. fn The failure to report strongly suggests a reluctance of Pakistan to detail 
the state of human rights in that country and  a discomfort with the international 
scrutiny of that situation that would then ensue when that report is issued. Non-
governmental organizations in Pakistan, such as the independent, non-political, 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, have presented to the world, blunt 
assessments of the state of human rights in that country.  In its publication “State 
of Human Rights in Pakistan” for 2010, the Commission makes the following 
statement concerning freedom of religion and the blasphemy laws of Pakistan: 
There were few positive developments in Pakistan in the year 2010 
with regard to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion and 
all indications suggested that there were even worse times 
ahead…..The year had begun with the government indicating its 
intent to reform the blasphemy law to prevent its abuse.  However, 
by the end of 2010 any change in the controversial law seemed 
more remote than ever.  This list of victims of the blasphemy law 
continued to grow.   
     Further comments in the human rights publication make it obvious that the 
government of Pakistan is fighting a real and ideological war against Islamic 
fundamentalists which impede progress to blunt anti-blasphemy laws.  The 
publication states as follows: 
A glance at developments with regard to the blasphemy law in the 
year 2010 characterized not only the government’s flip-flopping on 
reform of the controversial law but also showed how it lost its 
nerve in the face of intimidation by extremists after flirting with 
the idea of reform.  In February 2010, the federal minister for 
minorities’ affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, started that the government 
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intended to change the blasphemy law to check its misuse by 
extremists.  He said the government was proposing the changes to 
counter “some elements that misuse the law to create violence and 
disharmony in society” 
     With regard to the death sentence of Aasia Bibi, the farm worker convicted of 
blasphemy, the Commission noted that the Pakistan government had first given 
signals, in response to protests from the Christian community, that it would 
pardon that sentence, but did not do so when confronted with vows of Islamic 
fundamentalist religious leaders that in the event of such a pardon, there would be 
widespread civil unrest.  A Muslim leader promised 500,000 rupees to anyone 
who killed Bibi, and told a rally that if the government did not hang Bibi, he 
would ask the Taliban to do so.  The government backed down on efforts to 
reform the anti-blasphemy laws and did not prosecute the cleric; notwithstanding 
that incitement to murder is a violation of Pakistani law. 
                 Modest but Critical Influence in Blunting Anti Blasphemy Laws 
     The government of Pakistan is in a very difficult position.  Its leaders seek to 
participate with other nations in full economic, political and cultural relationships.  
It diplomats would like to demonstrate that their nation wishes to comply with the 
obligations it has agreed to as signatories to an international covenant as part of a 
member of the United Nations.  At the same time, there are powerful cultural 
influences that resist the reform of harsh anti-blasphemy laws. There are also 
powerful forces within that country that make use of force and intimidation to 
resist such reform.  The most substantial weapon available to that government is 
the consensus of the international community as memorialized in the Covenant.  
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The Covenant can be thought of as the equivalent of a speed limit sign.  The sign 
is often ignored by the immature and/or irresponsible driver to whom it is 
directed.  Although motorists whip by that sign, it is made use of by more 
responsible occupants of a speeding vehicle, or those with authority concerning 
the driver’s conduct. Others make use of the moral imperative manifested by the 
sign to influence, implore or coerce compliant conduct of the driver.  In a similar 
way, it is obvious that concerning its anti-blasphemy laws, Pakistan has not 
complied with its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.  However, the Covenants may be instrumental in the efforts by 
the responsible segments of that society, as the collective voice of the 
international community, to influence the provision of human rights in that 
country. 
       
  
 
 
 
